Friday, February 17, 2012
Donilon to Travel to Israel
Monday, November 28, 2011
US-EU Summit Overview
1. We, the leaders of the United States and the European Union, met today at the White House to affirm our close partnership. Drawing upon our shared values and experience, and recognizing our deep interdependence, we are committed to ensuring that our partnership brings greater prosperity and security to our 800 million citizens, and to working together to address global challenges.
2. Since our meeting in Lisbon last November, the global economy has entered a new and difficult phase. We are committed to working together to reinvigorate economic growth, create jobs, and ensure financial stability. We will do so by taking actions that address near-term growth concerns, as well as fiscal and financial vulnerabilities, and that strengthen the foundations of long-lasting and balanced growth. In that regard, the United States welcomes the EU’s actions and determination to take all necessary steps to ensure the euro area’s financial stability and resolve the crisis. The EU looks forward to U.S. action on medium term fiscal consolidation. We agree on the importance of working together with emerging economies to foster policies supporting sustained and balanced global growth. We recall our commitment to implement fully the outcome of the G20 Cannes Summit.
3. We recall our G20 commitment to support the multilateral trading system and resist protectionism. We stand by the Doha Development Agenda mandate and recognize the progress achieved so far, but note that in order to contribute to confidence we must pursue fresh, credible approaches in 2012 to advance the negotiations and pursue new opportunities and challenges. We look forward to the upcoming Ministerial meeting in Geneva, which provides an important opportunity to work on such approaches.
4. We applaud the success of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) on a wide range of issues and welcome the progress achieved in secure trade and supply chain security, electric vehicles and related infrastructure, regulatory practices, small and medium-sized enterprises, and in the Information Communications Technology (ICT) sector. We encourage the TEC’s continued leadership in helping us avoid unnecessary divergence in regulations and standards that adversely affects trade. We urge the TEC, together with our regulators and standard-setters to step up cooperation in key sectors such as nanotechnology and raw materials to develop compatible approaches to emerging technologies. We also instruct the TEC to pursue its work on strategic economic questions, not least in the field of investment, innovation policy, and the protection of intellectual property rights to level the playing field for our companies in third countries, in particular emerging economies.
5. We must intensify our efforts to realize the untapped potential of transatlantic economic cooperation to generate new opportunities for jobs and growth, particularly in emerging sectors. We are committed to making the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship – already the largest and most integrated in the world – stronger. To that end, we have directed the TEC to establish a joint High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, co-chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative and the European Commissioner for Trade. We ask the Working Group to identify and assess options for strengthening the U.S.-EU economic relationship, especially those that have the highest potential to support jobs and growth. The Working Group is to report its recommendations and conclusions to Leaders by the end of 2012, with an interim report in June 2012 on the status of this work.
6. We recognize the vital role of the U.S.-EU Energy Council in fostering cooperation on energy security, renewables and other clean energy technologies, energy efficiency, and effective policies for facilitating trade and bringing clean energy technologies to market. We affirm the value of common approaches toward safe and sustainable development of energy resources and the diversification of supplies. We also call for reinforced bilateral and multilateral cooperation with a special focus on critical materials, smart grid technologies, hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, and nuclear fusion.
7. On climate change, we affirm our intent to work closely together to ensure a positive, balanced outcome in Durban, including mitigation, transparency and financing. We stand fully behind the commitments we made last year in Cancun. We affirm that Durban should deliver on operationalizing the Cancun agreements and helping the international community move a step further towards a comprehensive, global framework with the participation of all, including robust and transparent greenhouse gas emissions reduction commitments by all major economies, recalling the 2°C objective agreed upon in Cancun. With this in mind, we will cooperate closely in other relevant fora, notably the Major Economies Forum. We also intend to work together to address other global sources of emissions, including from the aviation and maritime sectors, in the appropriate multilateral forums and consistent with applicable agreements.
8. As the leading donors of development assistance, we reaffirm our commitment to aid effectiveness, recognizing that our joint efforts to advance division of labor, transparency, country ownership, and accountability will enhance the impact of our assistance. We are coordinating our preparations for the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and will continue to work closely to strengthen partnerships among all development stakeholders, accelerate progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, and address the challenges encountered in fragile states. In 2012, we have committed to make information on foreign assistance programs more accessible and compatible with international standards, and will encourage the OECD DAC to become an international hub for aid transparency. We request the U.S.-EU Development Dialogue to pursue with vigor our joint efforts in areas such as food security, climate change, health and the MDGs. We agreed on the importance of close cooperation on security and development in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan.
9. The events in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya over the past year offer an historic opportunity for successful democratic reform in the Arab world, inclusive economic and social development, and regional integration. The unfolding democratic process in Tunisia is an encouraging example of the potential for democratic transition. Egypt today has just begun a complex election process as the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces begins to transfer authority over civilian functions to a new government. Still, considerable challenges lie ahead. As the two largest providers of foreign assistance to the region whoshare core principles and values that have helped our own societies and economies to integrate, we pledge to support the democratic transitions underway, as well as broader political and economic reform in the region, including the constitutional reforms in Jordan and Morocco. In Libya, we are working together on short term assistance and needs assessments, and will continue to seek new opportunities for greater cooperation, in coordination with the Transitional National Council and the UN, to meet the needs of the Libyan people.
10. Jointly, and through the Deauville Partnership effort, we intend to promote democracy, peace, and prosperity, and to increase economic growth and integration in the Middle East and North Africa. We are committed to collaborate closely in areas such as support for democratic transitions, strengthening the positive role of civil society, and health and education programming. We also extend our support to making women’s rights a legal and practical reality in the region. We share a strong interest in economic reform and will also jointly promote best practices that support trade, investment, and job creation and deepen intra-regional trade and integration. We are both eager to increase our trade and investment links with the region. We plan to work in partnership with international financial institutions to ensure robust donor coordination and in particular to ratify quickly necessary changes to the agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to allow lending in the region.
11. We call on the Syrian government to end violence immediately, permit the immediate entry of human rights observers and international journalists, and allow for a peaceful and democratic transition. We also welcome the agreement for political transition in Yemen and call on all political actors to help implement it in good faith, and in accordance with UNSCR 2014.
12. We reaffirm the Quartet Statement adopted in New York on 23 September 2011 that provides a framework for direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and we call on the two parties to engage actively in this effort.
13. On Iran, we share deep concern about activities relating to the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, as highlighted in the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General’s report and the November 18 Board of Governors’ resolution. We stress our determination to ensure that Iran complies with its obligations, including abiding by United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA to address the international community’s serious concerns over the nature of its nuclear program. We reaffirm our commitment to work toward a diplomatic solution, implement UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, and consider additional measures given Iran’s continued failure to abide by its international obligations. We also note the recent plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, the sanctions we have imposed thereafter on five individuals including the head of the Qods Force, and our determination to ensure the perpetrators and their accomplices are held to account.
14. With regard to the EU’s Eastern neighbors, we are working together to support democracy, resolve protracted conflicts, foster economic modernisation, and advance their political association and economic integration with the EU, recognizing in this regard the importance of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. We insist that the Government of Belarus immediately release and rehabilitate its political prisoners, and make progress towards respect for the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights; and call on the Government of Ukraine to make good on commitments to uphold democratic values and the rule of law, notably to ensure a fair, transparent and impartial process in trials related to members of the former Government including any appeal in the case of Ms Tymoshenko. The right of appeal should not be compromised by imposing limitations on the defendants’ ability to stand in future elections in Ukraine, including the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.
15. We pledge to continue our close cooperation in the western Balkans and reaffirm our commitment to preserve stability and to support the reforms needed to move the region forward on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration.
16. The United States and the EU have a strategic interest in enhancing co-operation on political, economic, security, and human rights issues in the Asia-Pacific region to advance peace, stability and prosperity. We intend to increase our dialogue on Asia-Pacific issues and coordinate activities to demonstrate an enduring, high-level commitment to the region and encourage regional integration, including through the region’s multilateral organizations.
17. We note our continued efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with particular attention to plans for the December 5 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan and the international community’s long-term commitment to support sustainable security and economic development in Afghanistan, based on effective and accountable institutions of governance and sustainable assistance levels, after the planned drawdown of international military forces. We support economic development and wider reforms in Pakistan and note Pakistan’s important role and ongoing commitment to combating terrorism and achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan and South Asia.
18. We note the considerable progress made since our last meeting in Lisbon on our commitments on a wide range of transnational security issues that affect our citizens. We welcome the successful completion of negotiations on a new Passenger Name Record agreement, and look forward to its early adoption and ratification. We are determined to finalize negotiations on a comprehensive U.S.-EU data privacy and protection agreement that provides a high level of privacy protection for all individuals and thereby facilitates the exchange of data needed to fight crime and terrorism. We reaffirm our desire to complete secure visa-free travel arrangements between the US and all Member States of the EU as soon as possible and consistent with applicable, domestic legislation. We look forward to a positive outcome for Administration-supported legislation that would refine the criteria for the Visa Waiver Program.
19. We encourage continued efforts to extend our partnership on counter-terrorism cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, including through the UN. We applaud the establishment of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, and our cooperation to combat terrorist financing. We strongly support continuation of our joint efforts to empower diaspora communities to counter violent extremism.
20. To strengthen our collaboration on conflict prevention and crisis response, already ongoing in many theaters, the U.S. and EU signed a framework agreement in May 2011 that facilitates U.S. civilian participation in EU crisis management missions. As the trans-Atlantic community faces the challenges of crisis management in an era of fiscal austerity, we encourage further work to strengthen the EU-NATO strategic partnership in crisis management, including on capabilities development, ahead of the 2012 NATO Summit, in the spirit of mutual reinforcement, inclusiveness, and decision-making autonomy.
21. We reaffirm the commitments enshrined in the joint declaration on non-proliferation and disarmament we adopted in 2009 and the joint statement on UNSCR 1540 in 2011. We support the conclusions and recommendations of the May 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, including the Action Plan and proposed 2012 Middle East conference. We are determined to promote the IAEA’s safeguards, Additional Protocol, and the highest standards of safety and security for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Nuclear Security Summit objectives, a successful Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, and the convening of a Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012.
22. We share a commitment to a single, global Internet, and will resist unilateral efforts to weaken the security, reliability, or independence of its operations— recognizing that respect for fundamental freedoms online, and joint efforts to strengthen security, are mutually reinforcing. We welcome the progress made by the U.S.-EU Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime, notably the successful Cyber Atlantic 2011 exercise. We endorse its ambitious goals for 2012, including combating online sexual abuse of children; enhancing the security of domain names and Internet Protocol addresses; promotion of international ratification, including by all EU Member States, of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime ideally by year’s end; establishing appropriate information exchange mechanisms to jointly engage with the private sector; and confronting the unfair market access barriers that U.S. and European technology companies face abroad.
23. Our meeting today is proof that a strong U.S.-EU partnership is crucial to building a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world. We know that our ability to respond to and overcome the global challenges we face is increased by the degree to which we can act in close coordination and cooperation. We will continue to seek every opportunity to increase our cooperation.
Monday, September 26, 2011
Addabbo Addresses JFK Security Concerns, Meets with Assemblyman Goldfeder


Wednesday, September 7, 2011
Politics in Action: H.R. 1892

STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY
H.R. 1892 – Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012
(Rep. Rogers, R-MI)
The Administration appreciates the support of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) for the resources, capabilities, and authorities for the Intelligence Community and supports many of the provisions contained in H.R. 1892. However, the Administration has serious concerns with several provisions, including those described below, that would invite conflict between the branches of government.
The Administration looks forward to reviewing the updated classified annex accompanying H.R. 1892. In a letter from the Director of National Intelligence dated August 30, 2011, the Administration identified specific provisions in the Senate classified annex that also raised serious concerns. If H.R. 1892 is presented to the President and includes the issues of concern described below and includes, but does not adequately address, the specific provisions of the Senate classified annex, the President’s senior advisors would recommend a veto.
Submission of Information on Detainees Held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: The Administration strongly objects to sections 307 and 309, which would state that the DNI must provide the Intelligence Committees with each Department of State cable, memorandum, or report containing certain information relating to Guantanamo Bay detainees, as well as government-to-government assurances related to the transfer of those detainees. The Administration believes that such disclosure will have a significant adverse impact on the willingness of foreign partners, who often expressly request this information not be disseminated, to communicate frankly on these matters.
The cables and other documents at issue – originated and controlled by the Department of State, not the ODNI – contain deliberative commentary and sensitive diplomatic discussions and negotiations, including commitments made by foreign governments relating to the handling of transferred detainees. The Department of State has accordingly declined to produce these documents to Congress or to U.S. federal courts because of the need to protect diplomatic communications in conducing effective foreign relations. The Administration is concerned that these provisions may conflict with the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to control the disclosure of information when necessary to preserve the Executive's ability to perform its constitutional responsibilities.
Confirmation of Appointment of the Director of the National Security Agency: The Administration strongly objects to section 421, which would add a requirement that the person nominated for the position of Director of the National Security Agency be confirmed by the Senate. The Administration believes that if this provision were to become law, a critical national security position would likely remain unfilled for a significant period of time, adversely impacting the management and function of the National Security Agency.
The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress to address these and other concerns.
Image source: National Security Agency website
Author: U.S. Government
Permission: Public Domain
Thursday, July 21, 2011
TSA Eliminates Nude Body Scans With New Software
Multisource political news, world news, and entertainment news analysis by Newsy.com
Friday, July 1, 2011
Obama Nominates Olsen as NCTC Director

President Obama has nominated Matthew Olsen as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Olsen will play a key role on the President’s national security team – bringing a strong voice and critical knowledge to integrate intelligence in order to protect Americans across the nation and around the world.
“I am pleased to nominate Matthew Olsen to be the next Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Matt has a distinguished record of service in our intelligence community and I’m confident he will continue to build on our strong counterterrorism efforts,” said President Obama.
“Matt will be a critical part of my national security team as we work tirelessly to thwart attacks against our nation and do everything in our power to protect the American people.”
If confirmed, Olsen will build on the important work of the dedicated intelligence professionals at NCTC who work every day to keep our nation safe and secure. He will continue NCTC’s mission to integrate intelligence relating to counterterrorism and to share that information with agencies and departments across the federal government.
Additionally, Olsen will continue NCTC’s critical effort to conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities across the federal government, ensuring that we bring the full weight of our diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement authorities and capabilities to bear to thwart terrorist plans. NCTC is organizationally part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
He currently serves as the General Counsel for the National Security Agency (NSA) and principal legal advisor to the NSA Director.
Olsen previously served in the Department of Justice as an Associate Deputy Attorney General and was responsible for supervising and coordinating national security and criminal matters. From 2009 to 2010, he was Special Counselor to the Attorney General and Executive Director of the Guantanamo Review Task Force.
In this role, he managed the interagency effort to conduct a comprehensive review of intelligence information on the Guantanamo detainees. Olsen also served as the acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security during the 2009 presidential transition, supervising the daily operation of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division.
From 2006 to 2009, he was a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division and was responsible for the management of the Department’s intelligence operations and oversight. In this position, Olsen supervised the implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, helped craft landmark legislative changes to the surveillance laws, and advised government officials on intelligence activities and national security.
From 1994 to 2006, Olsen was a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. From 2005-2006, he was the chief of the office’s National Security Section, where he supervised the investigation and prosecution of terrorism, espionage, and export violation matters.
Olsen served as Special Counsel to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 2004 to 2005, where he focused on counterterrorism and intelligence investigations. As an Assistant United States Attorney, Olsen successfully prosecuted a violent drug trafficking organization in the longest criminal trial ever in the District of Columbia.
Olsen graduated from Harvard Law School (J.D.) and the University of Virginia (B.A.). He is an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University.
Author: Department of Justice
Permission: Public Domain
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
H.R. 2017 - Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2012

STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY
H.R. 2017 — Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2012
(Rep. Rogers, R-KY)
The Administration supports House passage of H.R. 2017, making appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2012. The Administration is committed to ensuring the Nation lives within its means and reducing the deficit so that the Nation can compete in the global economy and win the future. That is why the President put forth a comprehensive fiscal framework that reduces the deficit by $4 trillion, supports economic growth and long-term job creation, protects critical investments, and meets the commitments made to provide dignity and security to Americans no matter their circumstances.
While overall funding limits and subsequent allocations remain unclear pending the outcome of ongoing bipartisan, bicameral discussions between the Administration and congressional leadership on the Nation’s long-term fiscal picture, the bill provides insufficient funding for a number of programs in a way that undermines core government functions and investments key to economic growth and job creation. Programs adversely affected by the bill include:
Transportation Security Administration Passenger Security Fee. The Administration is concerned that the Committee bill fails to reform the aviation passenger security fee.
State and Local Grant Programs. The Administration is concerned that the Committee bill insufficiently funds the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s State and local grants, including Assistance to Firefighter Grants. The funding level provided will adversely impact the entire portfolio of preparedness grants to State, local, tribal jurisdictions, and the transportation sector. Further, funding the SAFER program at the Committee’s level would reduce the number of firefighters funded by approximately 2,200 positions. Although large balances remain available in these programs, State and local governments depend on this funding to support ongoing homeland security prevention and preparedness programs and ensure that all levels of government have the capacity to adequately respond to threats. The Administration supports and appreciates the flexibility given to the Secretary to allocate limited homeland security grant funding to those areas deemed most critical.
Science and Technology Research Funding. The funding for research and development provided in the Committee’s bill would limit the domestic investment in developing new capabilities to efficiently meet the demands of current and emerging homeland security threats through the elimination of more than 144 research projects in areas such as biological and explosives detection, advanced cyber security, and interoperability. Without domestic investment in new technologies and solutions targeted specifically at the homeland security threat, the United States will become increasingly dependent on foreign countries for any advances in homeland security technology.
Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter and Shore Projects. The Committee bill provides insufficient funds for key acquisition programs that will allow for the recapitalization of aging assets. The level of funding provided for Fast Response Cutters will unnecessarily delay production and increase future costs by delaying purchase of the proprietary specifications that are needed to replace aging patrol boats. Further, the funding level for shore and housing projects will deprive Coast Guard families of suitable housing in duty stations where housing market shortfalls exist and eliminate high priority shore projects that directly affect operations.
Transportation Security Administration. The funding level in the Committee bill for the Transportation Security Administration’s Federal Air Marshal Service will result in either reduced staffing in 2012 or curtailed domestic mission coverage on priority aviation flights. Further, the funding provided will not permit the deployment of 275 additional advanced imaging technology systems, which is an important tool for detecting both metallic and non-metallic threats as part of the aviation passenger screening process.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The Administration will continue to closely monitor Disaster Relief Fund balances and work with the Congress to ensure Fund solvency. The Administration, however, strongly objects to proposed language that would direct the President to submit a budget amendment or supplemental appropriations request with associated offsets when the Fund dips below a certain threshold. The Administration would view this provision as advisory.
Headquarters Consolidation and Operation. The Committee bill would delay the consolidation of the Department of Homeland Security headquarters by at least two years, resulting in higher lease costs and will mean the loss of construction efficiencies and increased future construction costs. The funding provided in the bill for the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management would result in a reduction-in-force.
The Administration also has a number of serious constitutional concerns. The Administration strongly objects to the provisions of section 537 that limit the use of funds to transfer detainees and otherwise restrict detainee transfers. Although the Administration opposes the release of detainees within the United States, section 537 is a dangerous and extraordinary challenge to critical Executive branch authority to determine when and where to prosecute detainees, based on the facts and the circumstances of each case and our national security interests. It unnecessarily constrains the Nation's counterterrorism efforts and would undermine national security, particularly where Federal courts are the best – or even the only – option for incapacitating dangerous terrorists. For decades, presidents of both political parties have leveraged the flexibility and strength of this country’s Federal courts to incapacitate dangerous terrorists and gather critical intelligence. The prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is an essential element of counterterrorism efforts – a powerful tool that must remain an available option.
The Administration strongly opposes any inclusion of ideological and political provisions that are beyond the scope of funding legislation. Should the Congress continue to include language that is not relevant to a funding debate, the Administration will oppose the bill.
The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress as the fiscal year 2012 appropriations process moves forward.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
S. 1038 – PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011

STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY
S. 1038 – PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011
(Sen. Reid, D-NV, and Sen. McConnell, R-KY)
The Administration strongly supports the enactment of S.1038, which reauthorizes through June 1, 2015, three critical authorities that our Nation's intelligence and law enforcement agencies need to protect our national security. These authorities, which expire after May 26, 2011 absent extension, are: (1) section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which provides authority for roving surveillance of targets who take steps that may thwart Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance; (2) section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which provides authority to compel production of business records and other tangible things with the approval of the FISA court; and (3) section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which provides authority under FISA to target non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, but are not necessarily associated with an identified terrorist group (the so-called "lone wolf" provision). It is essential to avoid any hiatus in these critical authorities.
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
White House Briefs
Monday, March 28, 2011
White House Briefs
PRESS SECRETARY JAY CARNEY
AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
DENIS McDONOUGH
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
11:36 A.M. EDT
MR. CARNEY: Good morning, everyone. Thanks for coming to this morning’s gaggle. I just want to clarify that this is pen and pad only. It is not for broadcast of any kind. And with that, as you know, I have with me today Denis McDonough, the President’s deputy national security advisor.
Neither Denis nor I is here to preview the President’s speech. We are here to -- Denis can talk to you about the questions you have about -- substantive questions about Libya, what’s happening there or other issues, but we’re not going to get ahead of the President in terms of the -- what he will actually say in the speech.
So with that, why don't we get started?
Q Are you going to start?
MR. CARNEY: Ben.
Q Okay, well. (Laughter.)
MR. CARNEY: We can end it now if you like, or move on to other issues. (Laughter.)
Q We have a Denis McDonough sighting. It’s good to see you. I will make a run at something here. Can we -- even in a broad sense, can we expect the President to talk about the Libya conflict in the context of the broader Middle East and other aspects of what’s happening in this volatile region, or is this a Libya speech?
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, Ben, it’s nice to see you, and thanks for the opportunity to speak with all of you this morning.
I’m going to follow the guidance of my colleague Jay and not get into the contents of the speech today. Obviously, that will -- the President will lay that down tonight. And you’ve heard him talk about it generally. You heard Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton talk about our case yesterday, and they surely put it in the context of the region and what’s happening in the region.
Q So going forward, once the U.S. has fully pulled back to this support role and the civilian protection and no-fly, how many ships, planes and service members will we have -- approximately will we have committed to this effort?
MR. McDONOUGH: I didn't understand the full -- I think like the fourth or fifth word you said when we pull back to this what?
Q Support.
MR. McDONOUGH: Oh, okay.
Q That's the word you guys have been using, right?
MR. McDONOUGH: I just didn't understand --
Q So when you guys pull back to the support effort, how many ships, planes and servicemembers will you have committed to this?
MR. McDONOUGH: I don't have a specific number for you, Jake, but --
Q Do you have a rough number, an idea?
MR. McDONOUGH: I’m sure the Joint Staff does, but I don't have that for you right now.
Q Tomorrow they’ll be convening a high-level conference in London to talk about the Libya situation going forward. And Secretary Clinton already mentioned that there will be -- as a post-Qaddafi era. Do you see this conference providing any kind of a way out for Qaddafi, a way, a sort of final “this is your last chance to leave quietly or else” kind of situation? Or is it not going to get quite that specific?
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, we’re obviously very gratified that the U.K. is going to be leading the conference. And Secretary Clinton will obviously be participating as our representative. We do think it’s very important to spell out an end-state, a vision of where this goes. And it’s also very important that we have the opportunity to work that jointly with our allies and with all the countries -- all of our partner countries. So you’ll see a big Arab League presence, as we understand it. And obviously, as the Secretary indicated over the weekend, that you’ll see a presence of Libyan opposition, as well.
So we -- I’m not going to get ahead of the conference because it is a U.K.-led effort. But we do expect that there will be some amplification of the political end-state. And what the Libyan people can expect, which, as the President has made clear throughout this effort, that the bottom line here is that they need to have a greater say in their own future -- something that they have not had for 41 years.
Q And on Syria, the situation continues to deteriorate there. The Syrian forces have been firing on protestors again today. Can you give us a sense of -- is there any sense within this administration that -- of taking acting against Syria, similar to what’s being taken by a coalition against Qaddafi of Libya? And where do you see the whole situation heading?
MR. MCDONOUGH: Well, I’m not sure what you mean by “similar” -- the similar sets of actions, Matt, but --
Q Military action.
MR. MCDONOUGH: There has not been any discussion of that. What we have made clear through various channels is that we expect the Syrian government to respect the rights of Syrians to peacefully protest; that they -- as we’ve made clear across the region, that Syrians have every right to expect that their certain universal aspirations and values be respected, and we’ll continue to communicate that to the Syrian government and to others.
Q I noticed the French President and the British Prime Minister put out a joint statement on Libya, and why wasn’t President Obama part of that?
MR. CARNEY: I’d have to see the joint statement. I don’t know, Dan.
Helene.
Q Hi, Denis. Can you -- now that you’ve set the precedent in Libya, are you guys worried at all that now since we went into Libya that other countries and people -- other countries in the Arab region, including Syria or Bahrain or other places that blew up, are going to expect American intervention? I mean, are you worried at all about the Libya precedent?
MR. MCDONOUGH: Hi, Helene, it’s nice to see you, too.
Q What about the rest of us? What about us?
MR. MCDONOUGH: Well, you didn’t start your question by saying, “Hi, Denis.” (Laughter.) Just trying to keep it real here. (Laughter.)
Q Hi, Denis.
MR. MCDONOUGH: Hi, Dan. (Laughter.) You know, we don’t -- I think it’s very important that we see each of these instances, as the President has said since the beginning in the region, as unique; that obviously there are certain aspirations that are being voiced by each of these movements. But there’s no question that each of them is unique nationally, that each of them, frankly, is nationally motivated; it’s not an international thing by any means.
So we don’t get very hung up on this question of precedent. What we do -- because we don’t make decisions about questions like intervention based on consistency or precedent. We make them based on how we can best advance our interests in the region. And I think you heard Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates spell that out yesterday.
So do we worry about what’s happening in the region? We worry about it an awful lot. Do we worry about setting some false set of precedent? We don’t, because we’ve been very clearly communicating why we’re doing certain things in certain instances and not in others, and we’ll continue to do that.
Mostly, however, we’ll continue to respect the fact that each of these movements is a national and unique reaction to certain developments in their countries, and we’ll try to do our best to make sure that we recognize that, as we have kind of since the beginning of this effort.
Q But you’ve sort of -- with the Libya case, you’ve sort of made the argument that civilians were in danger and there was a responsibility to protect. I mean, if that becomes the case in Syria, is that --
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, I think we’ve made the case -- we’ve made the argument that each is very unique. And I think you’ve heard Ben and Tom and Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton and others spell out exactly why we believe Libya was unique. And insofar as we believe it’s unique, we believe it doesn’t set a precedent that should create any expectations in that regard.
Mara.
Q Very nice to see you, Denis.
MR. McDONOUGH: Nice to see you, Mara. (Laughter.)
Q Two questions. One, you said it’s important to spell out the end-state. Could you describe the end-state that you want to see?
MR. McDONOUGH: I think you’ll hear more and more about that from Secretary Clinton in the course of the next couple days, so I’m not going to beat to that.
Q You don't -- do you know what the end-state is that you want to see?
MR. McDONOUGH: We do, yes. We’ve been working on --
Q You just don't want to talk about it?
MR. McDONOUGH: No, I want to make sure that my bosses have the opportunity to talk about it.
Q Okay. The second question about precedent, just to follow on Helene. In the Saturday radio address, the President said that if we didn't do this, other dictators would be emboldened to use force against their own people. Isn’t that by definition the idea of a precedent; that you’re doing this to prevent other dictators from doing the same thing? Doesn’t that suggest that if they do it, they’re going to get the same response?
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, I think that, again, to take it back to where -- what I was saying to Helene -- the fact is that each of these instances is unique, and I could spell out each of the Libya examples which makes it unique: the fact that we had very unsettling and insightful language -- inciting language from the government, to include that he would use no mercy, or that he would go door to door and find people in their closets; his history -- threatening the King of Saudi Arabia; being behind an attack on American citizens, as has been very well spelled out in Pan Am 103; the fact that we had indications of the planning around the use of such violence against individuals.
All of those speak to the unique developments in Libya, and the reason why the President thought it was so important to send a very clear signal that in the event that -- as we did, for example, in the run-up to the elections in Sudan, making clear that the Sudanese leadership understands, as it relates to Darfur and otherwise, that we continue to watch developments, that we continue to be on top of them, and that the international community will hold leaders to account if they don't live up to their expectations.
Does that mean that every time we have to lead an international coalition to intervene militarily? Absolutely not. But --
Q But he seemed to describe this as a kind of deterrent or even a precedent --
MR. McDONOUGH: There’s a lot of ways to --
Q -- where he says that if we didn't do this --
MR. McDONOUGH: I think there’s a lot -- I think what the President is referring to, Mara, is that there is a lot of ways to deter the kind of hateful actions that we’ve seen too often over the course of time.
That could mean, obviously, increasing the amount of time and attention we focus on these issues, making sure that people are understanding that we’re accumulating reporting as it relates to the mistreatment of individuals. And we’ve done that in Sudan. We did that in Libya. We continue to make that case as it relates, for example, in the Libya case, by having the ICC referral in the first resolution out of the Security Council.
So, again, the idea that since we intervened -- since we had led an international coalition to shape the environment for an intervention in Libya means that we have to intervene everywhere else just belies the fact that we don't intervene based on precedent or based on a certain set of consistency guidelines but rather so that we can advance our interests. And each of those interests is going to be unique in each instance.
Q Denis, you said you won’t address the substance of tonight’s speech. How about the procedure? Why is this not in the Oval Office? Why is it at NDU?
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, I think it’s very important to go down to NDU, which is a place where we have mid-career officers from each of the services who are currently serving or who have -- many of them just come back from tours overseas. But if you just line it up, Chip, about what our military is doing right now -- undertaking an enormous effort in Japan to support our Japanese allies in this moment of great trial; continuing the effort in Afghanistan to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for al Qaeda; winding down our effort in Iraq so as to ensure the hand-over at the end of this -- at the end of next year, so that we are in a position to shape the environment using our unique assets and capabilities in Libya so that we can hand off to our allies.
Q So he’ll be addressing all --
MR. McDONOUGH: So he wants to send a very clear signal to the folks there to that regard. But as it relates to whether it should be in the Oval or somewhere else, I think that that's probably better addressed to somebody else.
Q Will he be addressing all those issues tonight that you just went through?
MR. McDONOUGH: I’ll let the speech speak for itself later on.
Q Well, what about the argument that has been widely reported, or at least commentated that he’s doing it to downplay the importance of the Libya operation -- that's why he’s not in the Oval Office.
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, you know, we’ve had meetings every day with the President, and the President is meeting every day either telephonically, in person -- including over the weekend -- with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice President, General Ham, Secretary of State and his National Security Advisor because of the importance he attaches to it. The fact is that he attaches great importance to it. And as I think each of you has heard him say, no issue weighs more heavily on him and he attaches no greater importance to any issue than the decision to send our men and women in uniform into conflict.
Wendell.
Q Denis, is our part of the heavy lifting basically done now in Libya?
MR. McDONOUGH: I think that we feel great -- I think the President feels great pride in the good work of our Marines, soldiers, airmen, sailors because of the remarkable and successful work that they’ve done in turning back, as he said in the speech -- or in the address on Saturday, in turning back the potential onslaught in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, and other places. So I think he feels very proud of their work.
I don't know if you want to characterize it as heavy lifting or whether the important support missions that the President referred to going forward, I think those are -- ultimately come at a big sacrifice with our troops deployed overseas and doing things away from their families. So I think that's all -- I always consider each of those deployments for our guys to be a heavy lift because they are taking time away from their family and doing things that are -- that the President is calling on them to do.
So I don't want to get into the business of characterizing which is heavy and which is light, but I do know that he’s very proud of the work that they’ve done.
Q Can this be called a “Mission Accomplished” moment?
MR. McDONOUGH: I think we’ll -- the President in his address on Saturday laid out what he thinks about what’s happened so far, and I think he’ll discuss that more tonight.
Chuck.
Q Denis, two things. One, I want to follow up on Helene’s question. The President on -- I believe it was on Tuesday in El Salvador said one of the justifications for doing this in Libya had to do with the fragile status of Tunisia and Egypt. So this is a case -- I mean you’ve been making this argument, each -- everything is unique, and yet this was a case where he felt one of the justifications has to do with what’s going on in the region. So can you square that with a Syria, with a Bahrain, with a Yemen?
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, I’d have to go back and look at the specific comment in El Salvador, Chuck. But I think the reference there is to the fact that both Tunisia and Egypt, which I’ve -- Tunisia being the first, Egypt being kind of the center of gravity for the region and historically a real bellwether and leader for the region -- are going through important transitions. And I think that insofar as you saw a humanitarian crisis engulf Libya and lead to a mass exodus of people, either to Tunisia or to Egypt, I think that what he is referring to there is the fact that that would not be in our interests, particularly at this time of delicate transition.
Q But looking to Syria, Syria is -- while Egypt culturally the center of the Arab world, Syria has been at the center of pretty much every Middle East conflict this country has ever dealt with.
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, again, Syria is an important country, and I think I’ve said -- I think I’ve made our case on that one, Chuck. I mean, we’re going to continue to make clear to the government that they ought to respect and -- respect the Syrian people’s ability to peacefully protest, peacefully speak their minds. And insofar as you want me to try to approach this as if what we’re going to do in one country works exactly the same way in another country, I’m just not going to go there because that's not how we operate.
Q And then do you have an estimate on cost? Do you feel as if you’re going to need --
MR. McDONOUGH: I don't have an estimate on that, but I think that's being worked.
Q And comfort level with the Libyan opposition -- has it grown over the last -- because you were very careful early on not to -- almost as if to say, it’s not necessarily that America is taking sides, but it’s trying to clear -- trying to create a fair fight, I guess.
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, I think what we’re trying to do, as I indicated earlier, that we’re -- rather than get into a characterization of the Libyan opposition, because I think that's quite a broad movement of people. You had the people -- shopkeepers and others -- and even in Tripoli, those first several days who were protesting and saying that the mistreatment that they’d been under for so long was -- needed to end. I think they’re part of the opposition. I think those people in Misurata right now who are pinned down by government forces are part of the opposition.
So I think it’s not just the forces that are carrying out this effort as they head back west from Benghazi. It’s not just those individuals, but I think it’s individuals that we saw in those first several days -- shopkeepers, students and others. And there’s no question that they have every right to be heard on this.
Q Denis, can I take another shot since you didn’t answer my --
MR. McDONOUGH: I don’t know what the rules are, Jake, in terms of --
MR. CARNEY: Let me get a few more because we’re going to -- I don’t want Denis to have to stay here too long. So why don’t we -- Laura.
Q Thanks.
MR. McDONOUGH: Hi, Laura.
Q Hi. What is your assessment of the situation on the ground in Libya right now? And could you speak -- including the weekend events. And could you speak to the timing of the speech today, why this is the right moment for the President to be addressing the nation on this?
MR. McDONOUGH: I think the -- I’ve been very impressed by the reporting from many of your colleagues, which I think has been intrepid and I think it’s -- they’ve given us as good an understanding of what’s going on the ground any given day. And I think if you look kind of across the region and the great risk that many of your colleagues are taking to report for the American people, I think it’s very admirable -- not only admirable, but I think very accurate. And so much of the reporting we see reflects a lot of what we’re seeing in other sources.
So I think my assessment is not going to be much different than yours, Laura, which is that the opposition is -- has regained some momentum; that that momentum is feeding some sense of opposition -- or some sense of momentum throughout the country, not just in the east.
And that as it relates to timing, I think that the President has been -- has talked to many of you about it, and each of you has talked with others about in the administration -- has been talking to the American people about this since that Friday afternoon, and talking to Congress about it, really, since a couple of weeks before that when we had a kind of regular series of interactions and briefings and hearings and otherwise on this important issue. But I think he just thinks that given that we are approaching the moment that he indicated would be days not weeks whereby we would begin to transition to our allied lead, he thinks that would make sense to do that now.
Q But why does it make it sense to address the people at the moment when we’re transitioning as opposed to at the moment when we’re getting into it? I mean, why is this the -- is it sort of a --
MR. MCDONOUGH: Well, I disagree a little bit with the premise of the question because he did address the issue when we were getting into it.
Q Well, not in the same length, certainly.
MR. MCDONOUGH: Well, I mean, he gave a very good -- very complete set of remarks on that Friday, which obviously was preceded by a very good meeting with the bipartisan, bicameral leadership down in the Sit Room, another one of those which he did last Friday. Intermittent -- or in between there, we obviously had a series of interactions on the staff and member level on that. So we’ve been engaged with the American people on this throughout and we think this is another good opportunity to do that.
MR. CARNEY: Why don’t we just do two more. Peter and then April.
Q Denis, the Egyptian news agency is quoting the Arab League, as you may know, as saying that it would like to see a stop to the military operations to clear the way for some sort of a political solution. Do you have -- what would your reaction be to that? And is this any indication of sort of a split from the portrayal that the President has been offering that the Arab Leagues is on board, too?
MR. McDONOUGH: Well, I think the Arab League will be present, members and other -- members and Arab League functionaries will be present tomorrow in London, so they’ll have an opportunity to discuss it there.
Q If I could just jump in real quick on terms of a transition to -- Denis, if -- Denis McDonough -- if I could just make this transition. When you talk about the transition, going forward do you see the U.S. playing anything -- once the transition is complete, anything other than a supporting role? Or is it once we’ve crossed over into supporting role, are we in a supporting role for -- and just in Libya, keeping it Libya specific?
MR. MCDONOUGH: I mean, I think the -- I think as Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates talked about yesterday that we -- we’ve been working very closely with our allies and with our partners; been intense -- intense planning being done over at the North Atlantic Council to ensure that our -- the alliance can take over each of these functions. And so obviously we’ll continue to support that, but we don’t see anything beyond that.
MR. CARNEY: And April, you’re last for Denis. And I’ll stay and take questions on other issues or similar issues, but I want to let Denis get back to work.
April.
Q Good morning.
MR. MCDONOUGH: Hello, April.
Q How are you? All right, with this military action in Libya, how is the administration looking at reshaping or continuing, even, its message to the Muslim world? You had Iraq, you have Afghanistan, and now Libya. And then also, prior to the military action and Libya, how often did President Obama talk with his commander at AFRICOM, then Commander Kip Ward? Because we know he talks to Petraeus and other commanders, but how often did he keep in touch with AFRICOM, especially knowing the buildup -- potential buildup into Libya?
MR. MCDONOUGH: I’m forgetting first question, April.
Q The first question is the Muslim message.
MR. MCDONOUGH: Oh, right. Well, the message continues to be the same, which is that I think if -- as you look at this, the -- obviously the Arab League and the Gulf countries strongly endorse the idea of a no-fly zone expressly because I think they were worried about the potential threat to Muslims in Libya as a result of the actions of the government.
We, obviously, continue to express the same kind of messaging that we have kind of throughout this, basically since the Cairo speech, but also throughout this effort and this series of reform and changes in the region, which is that there are certain aspirations which are universal. And people, regardless of their religion or ethnicity, ought to have the opportunity to express them. And we’ll continue to underscore that as we have here and abroad going forward.
As it relates to AFRICOM, the President -- I guess I could probably try to find a calendar, April, of expressly when he met with him. But, for example, before we had these series of daily briefings that the President has been having with his team, he had had dinner earlier in the week with his combatant commanders, and General Ward and General Ham were both there, the outgoing and incoming from AFRICOM. And then of course around Sudan, the planning for the referendum contingency planning there for, the President was in touch with AFRICOM and its leadership.
Q When was this dinner?
MR. McDONOUGH: He has an annual dinner here at the White House with the combatant commanders.
Q Can I follow up on April just real quick --
Q Let me finish --
MR. McDONOUGH: So oftentimes -- so the President has regular interactions with his team, but then many of the interactions are then incident-specific or issue-specific. So, for example, he does have the monthly SVTCs with General Petraeus, General Mattis, and others, as it relates to Afghanistan.
Q On Libya -- just real quick on the message to the Muslim world and the universal aspirations, because the message has been very similar to Syria and Jordan and Bahrain and Yemen, and yet your Nowruz message to Iran was really quite different. It was very specific. You mentioned names. You were very condemnatory. And then when you went on to speak to the youth, you came sort of this close to saying that if they rose up, you would support them. That's quite different from what you’re saying to the rest of the world.
MR. McDONOUGH: I’m going to let the President’s Nowruz message speak for itself. It’s become an annual effort here where the President communicates with the Iranians and others who are celebrating Nowruz, and so I think I'll let the message speak for itself.
Thanks, Jay.
MR. CARNEY: Thanks, Denis. So I’m here for more questions. We don't want this to go on for too long. But, Jake, yes.
Q There was a report out of West Point in 2007 about the people going through Syria to get into Iraq to fight U.S. troops, and that report had about a fifth of those going in to fight U.S. troops from Libya. There was also a Libyan opposition group that was affiliated with al Qaeda. And my question is, how concerned is the administration about the possible presence within this broad group of Libyan opposition figures that there are those who fought jihad against the United States in Iraq, or are affiliated with al Qaeda or affiliated groups?
MR. CARNEY: Well, Jake, what I'll say is that we have obviously spent a lot of time looking at the opposition in Libya and speaking with opposition leaders. Denis spoke a little bit about that just moments ago. I don't have anything for you on a specific concern. But what we have seen in Libya is something that's national and organic, where, as we’ve seen in other countries, the people of Libya have expressed their desire for greater participation, greater voice in their government, more representation.
But beyond that, I don't have anything specific on elements of the opposition that would be of concern.
Q How confident is the President that whatever comes next after regime change happens, assuming it does, which is the stated policy of this White House, that it will be better for the United States and in our interests -- that government?
MR. CARNEY: Well, I'll share Denis’ opinion that I don't want to get ahead of the Secretary of State, who, as I think you noted, will be addressing this issue to some degree in London tomorrow.
But I will say that in general, this is obviously a situation in the region where there is a lot of unpredictability. But the President believes strongly that it is -- serves the U.S. national interest and national security interests to be on the right side of history and to, as he did with regard to Egypt and as he has with regard to situations across the region, to support the democratic aspirations of the people, to support political dialogue between governments and their people, and that an outcome that results in greater pluralistic, democratic representative governments in the region will increase prosperity, stability and therefore -- and also be good for the United States of America.
Ben.
Q Jay, it sounds like the speech is an attempt to -- the President to explain and recap for the American people why the U.S. got involved, what its goals are, and what's happened, and where we go from here, as opposed to a new policy speech; a chance for people who haven’t been paying attention to every news conference and radio address to kind of hear it all in one place. Is that the right way to think about this speech?
MR. CARNEY: Ben, I’m not going to deviate off of our promise not to characterize or describe or use language from the speech. Obviously, he’s going to speak about Libya, but I don't want to -- while others -- (laughter) --
Q Can we get that -- that has to be off camera? (Laughter.)
MR. CARNEY: Can you -- you all can tweet that, all right? But Chip was asking about whether we’re going to talk about some other countries. But I don't want to -- I’m not going to steer you away from what you just said, but I don't think that I want to go into any detail about his speech because I think it’s important that it comes from him.
Q Well, what does the President want to accomplish?
MR. CARNEY: He will be speaking to the American people tonight to communicate about this very important issue, as he has on a number of occasions leading up to and through the decision to use military force in a coalition with our international partners in Libya. He thinks it’s an essential part of his job as Commander-in-Chief and as President to communicate with the people, just as with the people of this country about an issue this important, and just as he does -- just as he thinks it’s an essential part of his job to communicate with members of Congress, which I think we discussed a lot in earlier briefings.
Q Jay, just to follow up on that, a number of times you and Denis have said you’re going to hear more about -- we’ll hear more about this from Secretary Clinton tomorrow. Will the President leave things unexplained that Hillary Clinton will explain, or tonight will he answer the basic questions --
MR. CARNEY: Laura --
Q I’m not saying what he’s going to say, I’m just asking --
MR. CARNEY: -- just say what he’s not going to say.
Q Well, I’m trying another way. Will the questions that members of Congress have been asking be answered tonight, in terms of what he sees as the end-game -- you don't have to tell me what he’s going to say -- just, do you think that he’ll satisfy those questions, which have been coming from both sides of the aisle, or will he also leave that for the Secretary of State?
MR. CARNEY: No. Look, I was echoing what Denis said, specifically on the issue of what an end-state looks like in Libya and the fact that the Secretary of State will be discussing that question in London. But beyond that -- and the President will obviously use this opportunity to answer the questions that the American people have, as well as members of Congress have, about his decisions with regard to Libya. But I’m not going to -- you can keep trying, but I’m not going to characterize it more than that.
Q The problem that we have is that once the speech is delivered, it’s not like we can come back and then have this moment to say what his goals were.
MR. CARNEY: We’ll talk tomorrow.
Q But we’re going to all have to write about it tonight, so if you could just give us a sense of what the --
MR. CARNEY: But, Laura, he will speak at some length tonight about it, and he’ll do it well, and I think that you ought to --
Q I’m not suggesting he won’t.
MR. CARNEY: He’ll do it, I’m sure, better than I could from here. So I’d just point you to the speech.
Margaret.
Q Thanks. Without talking about the speech, will we -- will Americans have a better sense about what to expect in the rest of the region? In other words, I know each country is case by case and we’re trying to balance what are the U.S. interests against everybody’s desire for more freedoms and democratization and stuff, but is the new formula that if there’s a multilateral willingness to act and a multilateral agreement that a group-Western action would behoove everybody’s interests? Is that kind of the new parameter? There are all these other countries where all this other stuff is happening, and I think there’s two questions on Americans’ minds, right? One is what’s going to happen in Libya; and one is, when Libya is over, what’s going to happen everywhere else. Is the President going to talk about that? And what guidelines can you set forth for how that works?
MR. CARNEY: Well, again, without getting into the contents of the speech, I will say that every country is different. And -- as Denis said -- and we don't -- but there are overarching principles, which I’ve discussed and others; the President himself has discussed, which we -- he looks at this -- which he carries with him as he looks at the situation in the region and the specific countries where unrest is occurring and that is: nonviolent response; political dialogue; the universal rights of citizens. And that guides him.
These are the principles that he enunciated in Cairo in 2009, and those principles guide the way he views what’s happening in the region now. But again, our response -- our policy response to each country will be different because the countries are so different -- not both in their -- what their governments are like; what the cultural makeup is like; the size; the response that the government is using when there have been protests; the international community’s response.
Again, on Libya, do not forget that we had a United States -- I mean United Nations Security Council resolution -- two of them, and in terms of the use of the kinetic force, we had 1973. And beyond the UNSC, we also had support from the Arab League. We had support in a request from the Libyan opposition for precisely what the Security Council resolution allowed for, which was -- to go back to some questions we’ve had before -- that the Libyan opposition did not ask for the use of international force to create regime change, it asked for the help that we have given them in terms of a no-fly zone and the other assistance that's been provided. So these are unique set of circumstances.
Ann.
Q Why is the President not delivering this from the Oval Office? Why in an auditorium? Is it not -- and not primetime but at 7:30 p.m.? Is he trying to not make this speech comparable to other Presidents who have announced war efforts?
MR. CARNEY: I think giving an address that's going to be covered by the -- we hope by all the major networks and cable channels is -- signifies how important we think this is. As Denis mentioned, the National Defense University is a very appropriate place to give a speech like this, given the tremendous engagement and sacrifice that our armed forces have been making around -- Libya being the case specific right now, but around the world in different areas; and one area that Denis mentioned that people tend to forget because it’s not a traditional military operation, and that's the assistance provided to our allies in Japan.
And I think there are different venues to do this. It’s still -- it is the President speaking to the American people and -- at a time when we expect a lot of Americans will be home and able to watch.
Q Will he speak at all directly to any of the opposition voices in Libya, Yemen --
MR. CARNEY: Again, I don't want to preview the contents of the speech.
Laura.
Q Thanks. In the joint declaration made by Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron on Libya, which was just released, they are saying that they are insisting on a new beginning for Libya, and they're saying at the end, we must unite to help them make again a new beginning. Can we expect the President tonight to have something different than that?
MR. CARNEY: Well, again, I’m not going to get into the contents of the President’s speech, Laura, but I will say that, broadly speaking, the President has made it clear that he thinks Libya deserves a new beginning and that Colonel Qaddafi is no longer a legitimate leader of Libya, both in the eyes of his people or in the eyes of the world.
Stephen.
Q The advances of the rebels over the weekend appear to be possible because the coalition airplanes got there first and bombed the Libyan positions. Is that the policy now, moving from the defensive mission, which it was in Benghazi, to prepare the ground for the rebels’ advance? And is the coalition prepared to do that all the way to Tripoli?
MR. CARNEY: In terms of tactical military operations, I think the Defense Department is better suited to answer that question.
Q But that's a strategic question --
Q But that’s not -- yes, that’s not tactical.
Q But are you confident that what was taking place was compatible with the resolution protecting civilians? Is that -- is attacking military positions, the Libyan --
MR. CARNEY: Well, again, I think that the Defense Department is better suited to answer some of these questions. But I think that the civilian protection aspect of the revolution -- not a revolution -- of the resolution allows for taking action in order -- if the military forces were in question here, Qaddafi’s forces are -- are and have been attacking Libyan civilians, that goes right at the heart of the resolution and the mission it authorizes.
David Corn.
Q Thank you. What is the President going to say tonight? (Laughter.) Critics on the left or right and voices in the media have talked about there being some confusion in the public over the President’s aims and the goals and intentions of this mission. Do you believe that from the very start the White House has communicated effectively with the public about what the President is thinking regards to the Libyan action?
MR. CARNEY: Absolutely, yes. No, David, seriously, I think -- I want to get at this question, because somebody over the weekend on one of these shows suggested that -- or claimed outright that the White House had suggested that some of the questions raised by members of Congress were illegitimate. No one in the White House ever said that. I certainly never said that from this podium.
Questions are legitimate. They deserve to be answered. We have endeavored to answer them from the President, to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, Deputy National Security Advisor, and the Press Secretary and others.
So they’re all -- they are legitimate questions. And it is understandable that there is complexity here that needs to be explained and we have tried to explain, which is that there is the military mission, the goals of which are quite clearly laid out in the resolution authorizing the use of force in all necessary measures.
And then there are the over -- and there are the other baskets, the other tools. I think Secretary Gates said it well that we have more than just hammers in our toolbox here, and the things that we are doing unilaterally as the United States, but also in concert with our international allies, to put pressure on Qaddafi and isolate Qaddafi, that is also very much an important aspect of our policy.
And I think that where you see the question of confusion come up is this idea that because we have stated, the President has stated, that we do not believe Qaddafi is a legitimate leader and that he should leave power, and yet we are not authorizing our military -- or the U.N. Security Council resolution is not authorized to take out or remove or effect regime change in Libya, that there is somehow confusion in that.
There is a military mission designed to protect civilians, to enforce a no-fly zone. And there is a policy of this administration that we are pursuing through other measures that seeks to isolate and pressure Qaddafi to the point where he leaves power.
Q To follow up on that, Mitt Romney has attacked the President for being nuanced and timid on other things. Do you think that having a policy that has these different levels is just hard to explain in a hyper-media --
MR. CARNEY: I would just say, David, we’ve tried to explain it and I think -- when it’s explained well and clearly, that it is understandable. And the President has done that on a number of occasions, and again the American people will hear him speak to it tonight.
Yes.
Q NRC Chairman Jaczko is in Japan right now. Do you have any information? Was he instructed by the White House to go there in any capacity?
MR. CARNEY: I know that he is in Japan, but I don't have his -- I mean, it’s an independent agency, so I don't believe he was instructed by the White House. But obviously I think the fact that he’s there reflects the intense engagement between the NRC and its Japanese counterparts, the number of experts the NRC has had in Japan, trying to assist our allies there. And the fact that the chairman is there, I think, reflects that commitment.
Q May I follow up on that?
MR. CARNEY: Yes.
Q Thank you, Jay. So on the situation in Japan, what's the latest assessment by the administration on the situation on the ground? About a week ago the situation seemed to be -- stopped getting worse, but now Japanese officials are now saying that there may be a leaking from a core of a reactor. Is the situation deteriorating again, or what's your sense of that?
And secondly, on the ripple effect of the Japan earthquake on the U.S. economy or the world economy, a week ago General Motors announced that they laid off 59 people because of the disruption of the parts from Japan. What's your sense of the impact of the earthquake on the U.S. economy and the world economy?
MR. CARNEY: Let me take the economic question first. We continue to believe that while this is a very serious situation and has immediate impacts economically, that the -- we have great confidence in the resiliency of the Japanese people and the strength of its economy and believe that Japan will recover, and that is good for -- obviously for Japan but also for all of its trading partners and for the United States.
On the issue specifically with the reactors, I think the NRC is better suited -- or the Department of Energy -- to get into the specifics. What I can tell you is we obviously monitor it a lot very closely from here. The President gets constant updates. Our national security team is focused on this, continues to be focused on it. And we are aware of the fact that while the world’s attention has shifted to other areas, that the situation in Japan remains serious. And that's why we have committed so many resources to helping the Japanese in any way that we can with that problem.
Yes.
MR. EARNEST: Jay, we should just do last one --
MR. CARNEY: This is the last one, yes.
Q Thank you, Jay. And following up on the diplomatic talks to achieve U.S. stated goal of getting Qaddafi to leave, can you elaborate a little bit on -- beyond financial sanctions? What are they?
MR. CARNEY: Well, there were a lot of things that were laid out in the initial United Nations Security Council resolution, but they are -- the financial sanctions are important; the travel restrictions are important; the referral to the International Criminal Court is very important.
I mean, part of this is aimed directly at Colonel Qaddafi, but obviously a lot of it is aimed at those around him who have to make a judgment about what their lives will look like if they continue to stand by Colonel Qaddafi and -- with the full understanding that they will be held accountable by the international community. And we obviously encourage the people around Colonel Qaddafi and the Libyan regime to consider that very carefully, consider the future of their country, the future of their people and their own personal futures in making decisions in these next days and weeks.
Thanks, guys.
END 12:23 P.M. EDT
