STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY
H.J. Res. 64 – Joint Resolution of Disapproval of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(Rep. Royce, R-CA)
The
Administration strongly opposes H.J. Res. 64, a joint resolution of
disapproval of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached
between the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia,
and Germany), the European Union, and Iran on July 14, 2015. Enactment
of the resolution would greatly undermine our national security
interests on multiple fronts. It would effectively block the
international community from peacefully and verifiably preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon, allow for the resumption of an
unconstrained and unchecked Iranian nuclear program, and lead to the
unraveling of the international sanctions regime that was sustained
because the Administration sought to diplomatically resolve concerns
regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Further, enactment of the resolution
would deal a devastating blow to America’s credibility as a leader of
diplomacy and could ultimately result in the exhaustion of alternatives
to military action. If this resolution were enacted, the hard work of
sustaining a unified coalition to combat Iran’s destabilizing activities
in the region would be much more difficult, as would America’s ability
to lead the world on nuclear non-proliferation.
Preventing
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon has long been a top priority for
the United States and for the Administration. It has been the
Administration’s longstanding policy to retain all options to achieve
that objective – including possible military options. At the same time,
the Administration has worked diligently with the Congress and our
international partners to achieve a peaceful, diplomatic solution,
recognizing that a negotiated understanding offers a more effective,
verifiable, and durable resolution. The JCPOA achieves this objective
by reinforcing the prohibition against Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon,
verifiably cutting off all of Iran’s potential pathways to a nuclear
weapon, and instituting the most comprehensive inspection and
verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program. The
JCPOA makes the United States and the world safer by removing the
gravest threat that Iran could pose to the Middle East, including Israel
and our Gulf partners.
The
JCPOA, if faithfully implemented, will verifiably cut off Iran’s
ability to pursue a nuclear weapon through uranium enrichment, through a
plutonium pathway, or through a potential covert path. Iran is bound
under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons to never
seek a nuclear weapon and the JCPOA provides the tools to ensure that
Iran cannot use a peaceful program as cover to pursue a nuclear weapon.
The JCPOA is not based on trust, but on an unprecedented inspections,
monitoring, and transparency regime. Under the JCPOA, there will be
24/7 monitoring of Iran’s key nuclear facilities. Inspectors will be
able to get timely access to the places they need to go for inspections,
or Iran will be in violation of the JCPOA and risk the re-imposition of
sanctions. For decades, inspectors will have access to Iran’s entire
nuclear supply chain – from uranium mines and mills to centrifuge
production facilities. This means that in order for Iran to covertly
acquire a nuclear weapon, it would need to build an entirely separate,
undetected nuclear supply chain. The JCPOA also facilitates the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to complete its report on
the possible military dimensions of Iran’s pre-2003 program.
The
JCPOA also ensures that Iran has powerful incentives to keep its
nuclear commitments. Before getting phased relief from secondary
nuclear-related sanctions, Iran has to complete all of its major nuclear
steps which will extend the amount of time it would take Iran to
acquire enough fissile material for one weapon from the current two to
three months to at least a year. For example, the core of Iran’s
heavy-water reactor at Arak will be pulled out and filled with concrete,
rendering it unable to produce plutonium that could be used for a
weapon; two-thirds of its nearly 20,000 currently installed centrifuges
will be removed; its current stockpile of enriched uranium will be
reduced by 98 percent; and it must put in place the monitoring,
surveillance, and access measures that will ensure the ability to verify
that its nuclear program is used for exclusively peaceful purposes
going forward. If Iran fails to abide by its JCPOA commitments, all
relieved sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral, can snap back into
place.
The
Administration is fully committed to continuing to brief and closely
consult the Congress as we work with our international partners to
ensure successful implementation of the JCPOA. As we address our
concerns with Iran’s nuclear program through the JCPOA, the
Administration remains clear-eyed and shares the deep concerns of the
Congress and the American people about Iran’s support for terrorism, its
destabilizing role in the region, and its human rights abuses – this is
why we will continue to vigorously enforce our sanctions against these
activities and work closely with our partners in the region to counter
them, using a range of unilateral and multilateral tools.
The
JCPOA must be assessed by what it achieves on its central goal of
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon – and the Administration
urges the Congress to fully consider the stakes for our national
security of walking away without the international community. Without
the JCPOA in place, Iran would likely resume the advancement of its
nuclear program without any of the constraints or transparency required
by this deal and without the international unity of our sanctions
regime, which would be the worst of all possible worlds, leaving us in a
position of weakness, not strength.
The President has made it clear that he will veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of the JCPOA. If the President were presented with H.J. Res. 64, he would veto the resolution.
Source: The Office of Management and Budget
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